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Most existing studies of risk selection in the employer-sponsored health insurance market are case studies
of a single employer or of an employer coalition in a single market. We examine risk selection in the
employer-sponsored market by applying a “switcher” methodology to a national, panel data set of enrollees
in employer-sponsored health plans. We find that people who switched from a non-HMO to an HMO plan
used 11 percent fewer medical services in the period prior to switching than people who remained in the non-
HMO plan, and that this relatively low use persists once they enroll in an HMO. Furthermore, people who
switch from an HMO to a non-HMO plan used 18 percent more medical services in the period prior to
switching than those who remained in an HMO plan. HMOs would most likely continue to experience
favorable risk selection if employers adjusted health plan payments based on enrollees’ gender and age
because the selection appears to occur based on enrollee characteristics that are difficult to observe, such as




























Managed care health plans currently cover about 90 percent of the people who receive employer-
sponsored health insurance.  Health insurance companies often have incentives to design their plans to 
attract low-risk enrollees and repel high-risk enrollees.  It has been argued that a health insurance market 
providing both managed care and non-managed care plans may be inefficient because managed care plans 
may be more likely to implement such strategies, resulting in too few people in non-managed care plans 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998).  In fact, a number of studies have shown that Medicare HMOs attract a 
disproportionate share of the healthy elderly population (Eggers, 1980; Eggers and Prihoda, 1982; Brown 
et al., 1993; Cox and Hogan, 1997; Call et al., 1999).  Unlike the Medicare risk selection studies that are 
national in scope, most studies of risk selection in the employer-sponsored health insurance market 
examine single employers or employer coalitions, and the available evidence is mixed.  Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (1998) found substantial favorable risk selection among state government employees in 
Massachusetts for the HMO plan relative to the fee-for-service plan.  Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser 
(2003), examining the same data set, find that almost half of the expenditure difference between 
indemnity and HMO plans for eight medical conditions is due to a lower incidence rate among HMO 
patients (favorable risk selection), with the remaining difference due to lower provider reimbursement.  In 
contrast, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment did not find that a Seattle HMO experienced a 
favorable selection of patients (Manning et al., 1987), and Polsky and Nicholson (2002) conclude that 
HMOs in 60 metropolitan areas were not experiencing favorable selection with respect to non-HMOs in 
1996 and 1997. 
Eighty percent of the non-elderly who had health insurance in 1999 received it from their 
employer or from a family member’s employer.
1  Risk selection can occur because only one percent of 
U.S. employers adjust the premium payment to a health plan based on an employee’s risk, or expected 
                                                 
1 Current Population Survey, 1999. 
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medical expenditures (Kennan et al., 2001).
2  As a result, most health insurance companies receive the 
same revenue for enrolling a young healthy worker as an old sick worker, although the expected medical 
costs of the two workers could differ substantially.  If health insurers design their plans to attract the 
relatively profitable, low-risk enrollees, an inefficient allocation of individuals to plans may result.  A 
plan that attracts low-risk enrollees can charge a lower premium than a plan that is experiencing adverse 
selection.  As a result, some people who would enroll in a relatively expensive plan (usually a non-HMO) 
if premiums were risk-adjusted to reflect their unique expected costs, will enroll instead in a less 
expensive plan (usually an HMO) once the premium difference becomes sufficiently large (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 1998). 
Even though few firms formally risk adjust premium payments to health plans, risk selection may 
still be limited.  An estimated 20 percent of the employer-sponsored market is enrolled in self-insured 
plans where health insurance companies usually receive a fixed payment per employee to administer the 
plans and do not bear the financial risk of uncertain medical expenditures (McDonnell and Fronstin, 1999; 
InsterStudy, 2000).  Furthermore, about 50 percent of the people insured in the employer-sponsored 
market were offered a plan or a choice of plans from a single insurance carrier (Keenan et al., 2001).  In 
these two situations health insurers have no incentive to design plans to attract low-risk employees.  Some 
firms may also be implementing implicit (to the analyst) risk adjustment by setting the employer’s 
contribution for plans experiencing adverse selection higher than the employer’s contribution for plans 
experiencing favorable risk selection.  Such behavior would encourage all employees to enroll in the plan 
experiencing adverse selection. 
With the exception of Polsky and Nicholson (2002), all of the studies cited above that examine 
the non-elderly, employer-sponsored market are case studies of a single employer or employer coalition 
in a single market.  Since many employers have instituted measures to mitigate incentives for health plans 
to target low-risk enrollees, the results from the case studies mentioned above may not be representative 
                                                 
2 Medicare, on the other hand, does adjust payments to HMOs based on an enrollee’s age, gender, county of 
residence, Medicaid eligibility, and whether or not they are institutionalized in a nursing home. 
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of national conditions.  In this paper we examine whether HMO plans experience favorable risk selection 
in the employer-sponsored market by applying a “switcher” methodology to the Community Tracking 
Study Household Survey (CTSHS), a recently released national, panel data set of enrollees in employer-
sponsored health plans.  The switcher methodology compares medical expenditures in the initial year of 
people who chose to switch from a non-HMO (a fee-for-service indemnity plan or a preferred provider 
organization) to an HMO plan versus the expenditures in the initial year of the people who remained in 
the non-HMO plan both years (and likewise for people who initially were enrolled in an HMO).  In 
addition, we further decompose risk selection into a component based on enrollee characteristics that 
health plans and employers clearly observe (e.g., gender and age) and a component based on enrollee 
characteristics that are difficult to observe (e.g., preferences for medical care or health status).  This 
decomposition will help determine whether risk adjusting peoples’ premiums based on observed 
characteristics is likely to minimize or eliminate selection. 
We find that HMOs are experiencing favorable risk selection and that this risk selection would 
probably persist even if employers adjusted premiums based on an enrollee’s gender and age.  People 
who switched from a non-HMO to an HMO plan used 11 percent fewer medical services in the period 
prior to switching than people who remained in non-HMO plans, and this relatively low use persists once 
they enroll in an HMO, relative to those already enrolled in an HMO.  We also find that people who 
switched from an HMO to a non-HMO plan used 18 percent more medical services in the period prior to 
switching than people who remained in the HMO plan.  This relatively high use rate does persist once 
they enroll in the non-HMO, but the differential is not statistically significant.  Ten percent of HMO 
enrollees switched to a non-HMO between the first and second round of the CTSHS survey, and their 
departure is predicted to reduce an HMO’s aggregate medical expenditures by 2.0 percent per year.  Over 
a number of years, risk selection of this magnitude could allow HMOs to charge lower premiums than 
non-HMOs and attract enrollees who would prefer to be in non-HMOs if premiums could be perfectly 
risk adjusted.  Favorable risk selection by HMOs would most likely persist even if employers adjusted 
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health plan payments based on enrollees’ gender and age, because the selection appears to occur based on 




We define risk selection as the difference in medical resource use between HMO enrollees and 
non-HMO enrollees due to differences in enrollees’ characteristics, and therefore their demand for 
medical services, but not due to differences in the design and management of the two plan types.  If we 
compare resource use for people who have chosen to enroll in an HMO to people who have chosen to 
enroll in a non-HMO plan, we cannot determine how much of the difference is due to enrollee 
characteristics and how much is due to differences in how the plans are designed and managed.  We 
examine people for two years and compare first period medical resource use between people who were 
initially enrolled in a non-HMO and switch to an HMO in the second period to those who remain in a 
non-HMO plan, and likewise for people initially enrolled in an HMO.  By comparing resource use when 
the two sets of individuals were enrolled in the same type of plan, expenditure differences can be 
attributed to differences in demand for medical services due to differences in health and preferences for 
medical care, rather than differences in cost sharing or the extent of the plans’ utilization management 
efforts.  Since we examine risk selection only for people who switch from a non-HMO to an HMO or 
from an HMO to a non-HMO, we estimate a marginal risk selection measure that is relevant for the 
enrollees switching plan types, rather than an average risk selection measure that would be relevant for all 
enrollees.     
We derive separate estimates of risk selection for those who are initially enrolled in an HMO (H) 
plan and for those who are initially enrolled in a non-HMO plan (NH).  We aggregate medical resource 
use into a single expenditure measure using unit prices for each type of service (e.g., price per hospital 
day, price per physician visit).  Consider a sample of people who are observed in two time periods and 
were offered a choice of a non-HMO and an HMO plan by their employer in the second time period.  We 
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categorize people into four mutually exclusive groups according to the plan in which they were enrolled 
in the first and second periods: people who were enrolled in a non-HMO plan in both periods are coded as 
NH_NH, people who were enrolled in an HMO plan in both periods as H_H, people who switched from a 
non-HMO to an HMO plan as NH_H, and people who switched from an HMO plan to a non-HMO plan 
as H_NH.   
Using ordinary least squares, we regress medical expenditures for person i in the first period, 
measured in dollars (Yi1), on the four indicator variables that characterize the type of plan in the first and 
second periods, and individual and firm characteristics (Xi) that could potentially be observed by an 
employer and used to risk adjust premiums: 
(1) Yi1 = β1NH_NHi + β2NH_Hi + β3H_Hi + β4H_NHi + β5Xi + εi 
The difference in first period medical expenditures between those who switch to an HMO in the second 
period (NH_H = 1) and those who remain enrolled in a non-HMO plan (NH_NH=1) is (β2 - β1).  If this 
difference is negative and significantly different from zero, then HMO plans experience favorable risk 
selection relative to the non-HMO plans.  Among the population who are not already enrolled in an 
HMO, HMOs attract people with relatively low medical expenditures.  The difference in first period 
medical expenditures between those who switch to a non-HMO in the second period (H_NH = 1) and 
those who remain enrolled in an HMO plan (H_H=1) is (β4 - β3).  If this difference is positive and 
significantly different from zero, then non-HMO plans experience adverse risk selection relative to the 
HMO plans.  Among the population who are not already enrolled in a non-HMO, non-HMOs attract 
people with relatively high medical expenditures. 
If an employer uses observed characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and possibly health measures) to 
estimate an employee’s expected medical expenditures and adjust the premium payments that a health 
plan receives, all employees will be equally profitable from a health insurer’s perspective, ex ante.  To 
explore this, we first estimate equation (1) with controls for the geographic site (usually a metropolitan 
area) but without any enrollee characteristics X.  We then estimate equation (1) with an indicator variable 
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for an employee’s gender and a set of indicators for their age.  If (β2 - β1) and (β4 - β3) are significant 
without controlling for age and gender but insignificant once these characteristics are included in the 
regression, this implies that employers can mitigate risk selection by simply adjusting health plan 
payments for age and gender.  That is, health plans would not have incentives to design their plans to 
attract people who are expected to be relatively low users of medical services, because the premiums 
would be adjusted such that the expected profit would not vary across employee types.  We also estimate 
equation (1) with a more comprehensive set of possible risk adjusters such as self-reported health, income 
level, size of firm, marital status, and the presence of children to see if risk selection would persist with a 
more sophisticated risk adjustment system.  This specification probably includes more information than 
an employer would have for purposes of adjusting premiums, but we present it as an extreme case.  If risk 
selection is based on observable enrollee characteristics only, then health insurance premiums could be 
risk adjusted to prevent plans from designing their plans to attract the most profitable employees.  If risk 
selection is based on unobserved characteristics, on the other hand, then other policies such as a patient 
bill of rights law that restrict plan design may be useful.  
We restrict the samples in the above two regressions to people who could choose either an HMO 
or a non-HMO in the second period because we want to focus on situations where risk selection is most 
likely to occur.  If a firm offers one type of plan to its workers from one health insurer, then it is relatively 
easy for the insurer to predict aggregate medical costs since it will enroll all employees.  However, some 
people in our sample had a constrained choice of health plan types in the initial period -- they were either 
offered an HMO plan only or a non-HMO plan only -- and then had a choice of plan types in the second 
period.  Among those unconstrained in their ability to choose their type of health plan in the initial 
observation period, much of the sorting of risk between managed care and non-managed care may have 
already taken place in previous years.  To examine this, we create eight rather than four indicator 
variables in equation (1) – four variables for people without a choice of plan types in the first period (e.g., 
H_H
NC for people who were only offered an HMO in the first period, and chose an HMO in the second 
period when they had a choice of plan types), and four variables for people who were offered both an 
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HMO and a non-HMO by their employer in the first period (e.g., H_NH
C for people who had a choice of 
plans in the first period and chose an HMO, and chose a non-HMO in the second period when they had a 
choice of plan types).  The “NC” superscript refers to no choice and the “C” refers to a choice of plan 
types.  We would expect more pronounced risk selection among those who move from a constrained 
environment (NC in the first period) to an unconstrained environment relative to people who had a choice 
of plan types in both periods.   
  We also examine medical expenditures in the second period to see if people who switch plan 
types have higher or lower expenditures relative to the group of enrollees they join.  If, for example, 
HMOs attract relatively low users of medical care among the people initially enrolled in non-HMO plans 
but these enrollees have second period-expenditures that are similar to those initially enrolled in an HMO, 
then risk selection may lower the profitability of non-HMOs but it will have little effect on the 
profitability of HMOs.  This would be the case, for example, if the first period expenditure difference is 
due to a negative or positive health shock that is transitory, and does not persist in the second period.  We 
run regressions similar to equation (1), where the dependent variable is an enrollee’s medical 
expenditures in the second period, and the key variables are indicators for people who switched plan types 
between the first and second time periods. 
 
Data 
We use data from the first (1996-1997) and second (1998-1999) rounds of the Community 
Tracking Study Household Survey (CTSHS).  Each survey was administered to more than 60,000 people 
and was designed to be representative of the civilian noninstitutionalized population in 60 U.S. 
communities and the country as a whole (Kemper et al., 1996).  We focus our analysis on the 11,672 non-
elderly persons who were surveyed in both rounds and received health insurance from their employer or 
the employer of a household member in both years of the survey.  The regressions further restrict the 
sample to the 6,235 people who were offered both an HMO and a non-HMO plan by their employer in the 
second time period.  The CTSHS attempted to re-survey a random subset of the round-1 respondents by 
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calling the respondents’ telephone numbers used in round 1.  A person who changes his telephone 
number, perhaps because he moved to another metropolitan area or residence within the same 
metropolitan area, would not be included in our sample.  Of the 34,029 people who were non-elderly and 
receiving employer-sponsored health insurance in round 1 of the CTSHS, 11,672 were re-surveyed and 
were still receiving employer-sponsored health insurance in round 2.   
In the appendix we report coefficient estimates of a logit regression that equals one if the round-1 
respondent who was eligible from our perspective was re-surveyed and still eligible in round 2.  Many of 
the coefficients are statistically significant, which indicates systematic non-response.  As expected, people 
who we are likely to be relatively transient, and therefore to change telephone numbers during a two-year 
time period, were less likely to be re-surveyed: people between the ages of 18 and 55, non-married 
individuals, non-whites, and people with relatively low levels of education and income.  People who used 
medical services relatively intensely in the first round were also less likely to be re-surveyed.  Our results 
on risk selection apply, therefore, only to a relatively stable sub-population; we cannot extrapolate our 
findings to the general employer-sponsored population.  However, it is not obvious, to us at least, whether 
the systematic non-response biases our risk selection estimates and, if so, whether they are biased toward 
or against finding favorable risk selection for HMOs.  That is, non-respondents who expect to use a 
relatively large amount of medical services may favor either HMOs or non-HMO plans. 
The four key variables for this study are the characterization of HMO and non-HMO plans, the 
definition of a person who has a choice of plan types, the definition of a person who switches plan types, 
and a person’s estimated medical expenditures.  CTSHS respondents were asked to define their plan as 
being an HMO or not.
3  This question should result in preferred provider organizations (PPOs) being 
grouped with non-HMO plans, so we are essentially comparing lightly managed non-HMO plans 
(indemnity and PPO) versus more strictly managed plans (point-of-service and HMO plans).  We estimate 
the risk selection among the sub-sample who was offered a choice of plan types in the second round of 
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the survey.  We define those with a choice of plan type as all members of a household in which the main 
health plan policyholder had the opportunity to select either an HMO plan or a non-HMO from his or her 
employer.  We also consider household members to have choice if one member (usually a spouse) was 
offered an HMO plan only and another member a non-HMO plan only.  A “switcher” is defined as an 
individual who is enrolled in an HMO plan in round 1 and a non-HMO plan in round 2, or in a non-HMO 
plan in round 1 and an HMO in round 2.   
The CTSHS records medical service use (e.g., number of physician visits, number of hospital 
days), but not medical expenditures.  Since we want an aggregate measure of medical use, we estimate 
medical expenditure by applying resource weights per unit of medical care (i.e., unit prices) for each of 
the reported medical services, as was done in Polsky and Nicholson (2002), Manning et al. (1985) and 
Goldman et al. (1998).  The resource use weights are estimated from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS), and for both survey rounds we use the non-HMO prices.  Sample means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 1.   
 
Results 
  In Table 2 we categorize respondents according to whether they had a choice of health plan types 
in each round and the plan they actually chose.  The rows of Table 2 refer to the first round and the 
columns to the second.  The first entry of each “cell” reports the mean medical expenditures for those 
respondents in the first round, the second entry in brackets adjusts these first-round medical expenditures 
for an enrollee’s gender and age, and third entry in brackets indicates the number of respondents in the 
cell.  For example, a total of 1,897 people were offered a non-HMO only plan by their employer in both 
round 1 and round 2.  These people had actual medical expenditures in round 1 of $1,878, on average.  
Their risk-adjusted medical expenditures were $1,900, which indicates that their gender and age mix is 
similar to that of the overall sample.  Our regression analysis will be restricted to people who had a choice 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 If necessary, an interviewer elaborated as follows: “With an HMO, you must generally receive care from HMO 
doctors; otherwise, the expense is not covered unless you were referred by the HMO or there was a medical 
 10   11
of plan types in round 2 – people in the final two columns of Table 2.  People who switch plan types 
among those offered a choice in round 2 are listed in bold, and the percentage switching among those 
offered a choice of plan types in round 2 is reported in the final column.   
Almost half of the sample had no choice of plan type in round 1.  That is, they were offered either 
a non-HMO only (row 1) or an HMO only (row 2) by their employer in round 1.  A number of these 
people were offered a choice plan types in round 2 (column 3 and column 4 of rows 1 and 2), and a fairly 
large percentage of these people who were able to switch plan types between round 1 and round 2 did so.  
For example, 183 of the 726 people (25.2 percent) who were offered an HMO only in round 1 and were 
offered both types in round 2, switched to a non-HMO.  These switchers had medical expenditures in 
round 1 that were $1,001 higher than the people who were also in an HMO in round 1 ($2,861 - $1,860), 
were also offered a choice in round 2, and chose to remain in an HMO.  We measure risk selection with 
round-1 medical expenditures because the plan design and management were presumably the same in 
round 1 for those who subsequently switched out of and those who remained in an HMO; differences in 
medical expenditures should be due to differences in the demand for medical services. 
Non-HMOs experience adverse selection among the no-choice group enrolled in an HMO in 
round 1.  However, this risk selection is based on easily observed enrollee characteristics such as gender 
and age.  The difference in risk-adjusted expenditures between the “switchers” and the “stayers” in the 
second cell of row 2 is only $84: $1,910 - $1,826.  A simple risk adjustment system could equate the 
expected profit of these enrollees from a health plan’s perspective.  However, HMOs experienced adverse 
selection among the non-HMO enrollees who had no choice of plan type in round 1 but did have a choice 
in round 2 (row 1, column 3 and column 4 of Table 2).  The people switching to an HMO in round 2 had 
medical expenditures in round 1 that were $392 higher than the people who remained in a non-HMO 
($2,020 - $1,628).  These descriptive measures of risk selection do not control for the respondent’s market 
or control for more difficult to observe enrollee characteristics such as health status and income.  
                                                                                                                                                             
emergency.”  
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People who were offered a choice of plan types in both rounds (column 3 and 4 of row 3 and 4) 
are less likely to switch plan types than those who were constrained in round 1, as expected, although 
more than one-sixth of the people did switch.  HMOs experienced favorable selection among non-HMO 
enrollees who had a choice of plan types in round 1 and round 2 (row 3, column 3 and column 4).  
Round-1 medical expenditures for these enrollees who switched to an HMO in round 2 were $529 lower 
relative to enrollees who remained in a non-HMO plan ($1,511 - $2,040).   
We present our risk selection estimates in Table 3 and Table 4.  The sample for the regressions 
consists of individuals who were interviewed in both rounds of the survey and were offered both an HMO 
and a non-HMO in the second round.  In the first column of Table 3 we regress an individual’s medical 
expenditures in the first round on four indicator variables that describe a person’s plan in round 1 and 
round 2 and a set of 60 indicator variables for a person’s market (usually an MSA).  We do not include 
employee characteristics in the first specification in order to measure risk selection in a situation where 
firms engage in no formal or informal risk adjustment of premiums.  Coefficients on the plan indicator 
variables that appear in bold are statistically different from one another at the 10-percent level, and 
provide evidence that the expenditures of people who switched plan types differed from those who 
remained, on average. 
People who switched from a non-HMO to an HMO plan and had a choice of plan types in the 
first round used $210 fewer medical resources in the first round ($1,320 - $1,530) than those who 
remained in a non-HMO plan (column 1 of Table 3).  However, this difference is not statistically 
significant.  HMOs, on the other hand, did experience favorable selection because the enrollees who 
switched to non-HMO plans in the second round used more medical resources than those who remained 
in an HMO.  HMO enrollees who switched to a non-HMO in round 2 used $370 more medical services in 
round 1 ($1,957 - $1,587), or 18 percent of the mean medical expenditures of HMO enrollees in round 1.   
In the second column of Table 3 we add indicator variables for gender and age to see if the 
differences in medical utilization between those who do and do not switch plan types are due to 
differences in enrollee characteristics that an employer could use to adjust premiums.  If those switching 
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from a non-HMO to an HMO have lower expenditures because they are male and relatively young, 
characteristics associated with lower predicted medical expenditures, then employers could pay plans 
relatively low premiums when they enroll these types of workers.  Although gender and age do affect first 
round medical expenditures, as can be seen in column 2 of Table 3, HMOs would have still experienced 
favorable risk selection in a simple risk-adjusted market.  Medical expenditures for the HMO enrollees 
who switched to a non-HMO are still significantly higher than those who remained ($2,435 vs. $2,058), 
even after controlling for gender and age.  This implies that selection occurs based on unobserved 
preferences for medical care and/or characteristics that are more difficult for employers to observe.    
In the third column of Table 3 we include an extensive set of individual and firm characteristics, 
such as self-reported health status, marital status, household structure (e.g., married with children), race, 
education, household income, type of employer (i.e., private or government), and number of employees at 
the person’s firm.  When we include these characteristics that may be difficult for a firm to observe in 
order to control for enrollee expenditures, neither plan type would experience risk selection.   
Does the favorable risk selection for HMOs that we detect have a substantial impact on health 
insurers’ financial performance?  In our sample there were 609 people who switched from an HMO to a 
non-HMO.  Based on the second specification from Table 3, these people who switched to a non-HMO 
used $377 more medical expenditures in the initial year than those who remained in an HMO, or 18 
percent more medical resources than the average HMO enrollee.  These 609 people represent 10 percent 
of HMO enrollment in round 1 of our sample, so the loss of these relatively expensive HMO enrollees 
would be predicted to decrease aggregate HMO medical expenditures by 2.0 percent.  Although the 
annual impact appears to be small, if this magnitude of risk selection occurred over an extended time 
period, it could presumably allow HMOs to charge lower premiums than non-HMO plans and attract 
employees who would prefer to enroll in an non-HMO plan under a perfect risk adjustment scheme.  
In Table 4 we repeat the analysis presented in Table 3 but we now include eight indicator 
variables to examine risk selection separately for people who did and did not have a choice of plan types 
in the first round of the survey.  We would expect risk selection to be more pronounced for people who 
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were initially constrained – their employer offered either an HMO only or a non-HMO only.  We find 
some evidence supporting this hypothesis.  According to column 1 of Table 4, people who switched from 
a non-HMO plan and had a choice of plan types in the first round used $526 fewer medical resources in 
the first round ($1,121 - $1,647) than those who remained in the non-HMO plan.  This difference, which 
is 28 percent of the non-HMO average expenditure, is statistically significant at the 5-percent level and 
economically significant as well.   
The favorable selection for HMOs that we report in Table 3 appears to be concentrated among 
people who were offered an HMO only in the first round of the survey.  Among people who had no 
choice of plan types in round 1 and were in an HMO, those who switched to a non-HMO in round 2 used 
$1,000 more medical services in round 1 ($2,475 - $1,475).  In the second column of Table 4, when we 
control for an enrollee’s gender and age, the adverse selection experienced by non-HMOs and the 
favorable selection experienced by HMOs would persist.  When we include a more extensive set of risk 
adjusters in column 3 of Table 4, HMOs would still experience favorable selection among the enrollees 
who did not have a choice of plan types in the first round. 
Our analysis indicates that people switching from HMOs to non-HMOs tend to have relatively 
high medical expenditures.  However, if this expenditure difference is not persistent, then risk selection 
may not affect health plan profits and may not cause distortions in plan design.  This would be the case if 
the switchers’ deviations from average expenditures are due to transitory health shocks that do not persist 
in the following years.  In Table 5 we present coefficient estimates of the determinants of medical 
resource use in the second round of the survey.  The structure of the regressions is similar to Table 3 and 
the sample consists, as before, of people who had a choice of plan types in the second round.     
People who switched from an HMO in round 1 to a non-HMO in round 2 used $119 more 
($1,421 - $1,302) medical resources in round 2 than the non-HMO enrollees who remained in a non-
HMO.  This expenditure difference is not significant in column 1, or in the other columns when we 
control for enrollees’ personal characteristics.  Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
enrollees that non-HMO plans acquire from HMOs have the same expenditures as the experienced non-
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HMO enrollees once they join the non-HMO plan.  One explanation for this is a regression to the mean: 
these people had an acute illness in the initial period, used a relatively large amount of medical resources 
in the HMO, became disenchanted with the HMO and switched to a non-HMO in the second period, and 
used an average amount of medical resources in the non-HMO when their health returned to its normal 
state. 
The non-HMO enrollees who switch to an HMO, on the other hand, do use $322 fewer medical 
resources ($936 - $1,258) in round 2 than the HMO enrollees who remained in an HMO.  This difference 
is statistically significant and remains significant when we control for age and gender, which indicates 
that the expenditure difference is due to unobserved enrollee characteristics such as preferences for 
medical care or health.  Even with a simple risk adjustment system, HMOs would appear to be able to 
benefit from favorable risk selection.  This is a somewhat surprising result because overall, across the 
choice and no-choice groups, the non-HMO enrollees who switched to an HMO did use $200 fewer 
medical resources than the enrollees who remained in a non-HMO, but this difference was not statistically 
significant.  Apparently the people who switched to an HMO have persistently lower expenditures, 
possibly because they have weaker preferences for medical care and/or their health is positively and 
strongly correlated over time.  The expenditure difference is slightly smaller in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant in the final specification where we include variables that perhaps could not be incorporated 
into a feasible risk adjustment system. 
Our results, from a national data set, are generally consistent with switcher studies that have used 
a single employer or a coalition of employers in a single market, although the magnitude of our effects are 
smaller.  Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser (1998), for example, find that people switching from an 
indemnity to an HMO plan spent 36 percent less on medical care than those remaining in the indemnity 
plan, and people switching from an HMO to an indemnity plan spent 47 percent more than those who 
remained in an HMO.  Jackson-Beeck and Kleinman (1983) find that people enrolling in an HMO when it 
was offered for the first time had an average of 53 percent fewer hospital days in the indemnity plan 
relative to people who remained in the indemnity plan. 
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Our finding of favorable risk selection for HMOs differs from the RAND study and the study by 
Polsky and Nicholson (2002), studies that estimate average rather than marginal risk selection measures.  
As part of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, people were randomized to a Seattle HMO and their 
medical utilization was compared to people who chose to enroll in the same HMO.  Differences in 
utilization would be due, therefore, to differences in the demand for medical care rather than plan design.  
Manning et al. (1987) found no difference in the use of medical services between the two groups.  
Likewise, Polsky and Nicholson (2002) found no evidence of risk selection using the first wave of the 
CTSHS.  They decompose differences in expenditures between HMO and non-HMO enrollees into a 
utilization, reimbursement, and risk selection effect, where the latter effect is measured as a residual.  The 
switcher methodology generates a marginal risk selection estimate, since we identify the risk selection 
coefficients by the people who switch plan types.  If the people who remain in an HMO, for example, use 
slightly more medical services than people who remain in a non-HMO, then the average risk selection 
measure may in fact be zero.   
Another way to analyze risk selection is to see whether non-HMO enrollees with relatively high 
medical expenditures in round 1 are more likely to switch to an HMO in round 2, and if HMO enrollees 
with relatively low medical expenditures in round 1 are more likely to switch to a non-HMO in round 2 
(Call et al., 1999).  We examine this issue with descriptive data in Table 6 and with a regression analysis 
in Table 7.  In the first panel of Table 6 we divide the non-HMO enrollees in round 1 that had a choice of 
plan types in round 2 (and thus could choose their preferred plan easily) into six categories according to 
their medical expenditures in round 1.  Twenty-nine percent of the non-HMO enrollees who did not use 
any medical resources in round 1 switched to HMO plans in round 2.  In fact, the proportion of non-HMO 
enrollees who switched does not differ much across the first five expenditure categories.  However, the 
non-HMO enrollees in the top expenditure decile, with average medical expenditures in round 1 of 
$11,700, were much less likely to switch to an HMO (0.234 versus 0.286 for non-HMO enrollees as a 
whole).  This is consistent with the anecdotal stories that people with chronic diseases place a great value 
on remaining in a health plan that allows greater choice of providers and practices less aggressive 
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utilization management.  The low likelihood of switching among the heaviest users of medical care seems 
sensible because people who use a great deal of medical services are more likely than other enrollees to 
learn whether the plan is a good match.  
In the second panel of Table 6 we divide the HMO enrollees in round 1 that had a choice of plan 
types in round 2 into six categories according to their medical expenditures in round 1.  Eighteen percent 
of these HMO enrollees switched to a non-HMO plan in the second round.  Interestingly, the HMO 
enrollees who did not use any medical resources in round 1 were most likely to switch (0.226 versus and 
average of 0.184).  These enrollees may have switched in part because they were dissatisfied with the 
provider network and/or the plan rules.  This instance of favorable selection for non-HMOs is 
counteracted by adverse selection at the other end of the HMO expenditure distribution.  HMO enrollees 
in the top decile, who had mean round-1 medical expenditures of $12,500, were more likely to switch to a 
non-HMO plan than the average HMO enrollee (0.210 versus 0.184).   
In Table 7 we present results of probit regressions where the dependent variable is one if a person 
switches plan types between round 1 and round 2, and is a zero otherwise.  In the first two columns we 
restrict the sample to people enrolled in a non-HMO plan in the first round who also had a choice of plan 
types in the second round.  In the first column we include an indicator variable for individuals who did 
not use any medical care in the first round, a continuous variable of medical expenditures in the first 
round, and expenditures squared.  None of these coefficients is significant.  This is consistent with Table 
6, which shows that the proportion of people switching to an HMO was not correlated with use of medical 
resources except for enrollees who had about $10,000 of medical expenditures in the first round, and is 
also consistent with the results from Table 3, where the non-HMO enrollees switching to HMOs did not 
have statistically different expenditures than those remaining in a non-HMO.   
When we include indicator variables for a person’s gender and age in column 2, the coefficients 
on medical expenditures now indicate whether people who used more medical resources than would be 
predicted based on these observable characteristics, were more likely to switch to an HMO.  Such would 
be the case, for example, if non-HMO enrollees with strong preferences for medical care and poor health 
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used a lot of medical care and switched to HMO plans.  The insignificant coefficients on the medical 
expenditure variables in column 1 and column 2 indicate that medical use is not strongly correlated with 
the likelihood that non-HMO enrollees will switch to an HMO plan.  The positive coefficients on the age 
variables in column 2 demonstrate that relatively young non-HMO enrollees switched to HMO plans in 
the second period. 
In column 3 and column 4 of Table 7 we present results of probit regressions for the sample of 
people who were enrolled in an HMO in round 1 and had a choice of plan types in round 2.  The positive 
coefficient on the medical expenditures in column 4 indicates that non-HMOs are experiencing adverse 
risk selection, and this selection is based on characteristics other than gender and age.  That is, HMO 
enrollees who used more medical resources than predicted based on their gender and age were more likely 
to switch to a non-HMO plan in the second round.  However, medical expenditures in round 1 have a 
fairly small impact on the likelihood that an HMO enrollee will switch to a non-HMO plan.  A one-
standard deviation increase in medical expenditures ($4,657) is associated with a 2.5 percentage point 
increase in the predicted probability that an HMO enrollee will switch to a non-HMO plan (from 0.184 to 
0.209). 
The two methods of examining risk selection appear to be producing consistent results.  People 
who use medical resources relatively intensively are slightly more likely to switch from an HMO to a 
non-HMO plan.  Since the distribution of medical expenditures is skewed to the right, this small 
difference in the likelihood of switching among the heaviest users of medical services can produce fairly 
large aggregate differences in medical costs between HMOs and non-HMOs, especially if the risk 
selection occurs over multiple years. 
 
Conclusions 
  Almost all of the existing studies that measure risk selection in the non-elderly, employer-
sponsored health insurance market are case studies of a single employer or employer coalition in a single 
market, and most use data from the 1980s or early 1990s.  Since many employers have mitigated the 
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incentive for health plans to target low-risk enrollees by self-insuring and/or by offering a variety of 
health plans from a single insurance company, the results from these case studies may not be 
representative of national conditions.  In this paper we examine whether HMOs experience favorable risk 
selection in the employer-sponsored market by applying a “switcher” methodology to a national, panel 
data set of enrollees in employer-sponsored health plans.   
  We find evidence that HMOs experience favorable selection that would persist even if employers 
adjusted health plan premium payments for the enrollees’ gender and age.  People who switched from a 
non-HMO to an HMO plan used 11 percent fewer medical services in the period prior to switching than 
people who remained in the non-HMO plan, and that this low use persists once they enroll in an HMO, 
relative to those already enrolled in an HMO.  Furthermore, we find that people who switched from an 
HMO to a non-HMO plan used 18 percent more medical services in the period prior to switching than 
people who remained in the HMO plan.  This relatively high use rate does persist once they enroll in the 
non-HMO, but the differential is not statistically significant.  Ten percent of HMO enrollees switched to a 
non-HMO between the first and second round of the CTSHS survey, and their departure is predicted to 
reduce an HMO’s aggregate medical expenditures by 2.0 percent.  Although the annual impact appears to 
be small, if this magnitude of risk selection occurred over an extended time period, it could presumably 
allow HMOs to charge lower premiums than non-HMO plans and attract employees who would prefer to 
enroll in an non-HMO plan under a perfect risk adjustment scheme.         
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Table 1 
 
Sample Means and Standard Deviations (n = 11,672) 
 
Round 1 Variables         Mean           Standard Deviation 
 
Medical resource use ($000): 
- 1
st round (1996-1997)    $1,859               $4,317 
- 2
nd round (1998-1999)    $1,644               $3,883 
 
Individual and firm characteristics from round 1:      
Age 
   Under 2 years        0.017     0.129 
   2-17           0.188     0.391     
   18-39          0.340     0.474 
   40-55          0.367     0.482 
   56-64             0.087     0.283 
Female          0.526     0.499      
Marital status: 
   - single, with children      0.071     0.256     
   - single, no children       0.130     0.336    
   - married, no children                 0.210       0.407     
- married, with children     0.590     0.492 
Race: 
   White          0.843     0.364 
   African American       0.071     0.257            
   Asian          0.031     0.174     
   Hispanic         0.055     0.228     
Education: 
   Less than high school      0.242     0.428 
   High school graduate       0.264     0.441     
   College graduate       0.383     0.486     
   Masters degree       0.111     0.315      
Self-reported health: 
   - excellent         0.347     0.476 
   - very good          0.398     0.490    
   - good         0.197     0.398      
   - fair           0.049     0.215      
   - poor          0.009     0.094      
Household income: 
   - below $10,000         0.051     0.220     
   - $10,000 - $49,999         0.431     0.495     
   - $50,000 - $99,999         0.430       0.495 
   - $100,000+            0.088     0.283 
Employer: 
   -  government        0.219      0.413      
   -  fewer than 10 employees        0.102       0.302     
   - 10-1000 employees      0.325      0.468 
   - 1000+ employees         0.355      0.479 
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Table 2 
 
Health Plan Offerings, Choices, and Medical Use in Round 1 and Round 2 of the CTSHS Survey 
 
Top entry:   mean medical use in Round 1 
Second entry:   risk-adjusted (for age and gender) medical use in Round 1  
Third entry:   [number of enrollees] 
People who switched plan types and had a choice of plans in Round 2 are in bold. 
 
       Health Plan in Round 2 
               P e r c e n t a g e   S w i t c h i n g  
     Non-HMO,      HMO,   Non-HMO,  HMO,       Plan  Types  if  Offered 
    No Choice No  Choice    Choice Choice   Total    a Choice in Round 2 
  Health Plan in Round 1  
 
Non-HMO,  not  offered  choice   $1,878   $1,525   $1,628   $2,020   $1,782     
     $1,900   $1,804   $1,783   $1,870   $1,860 
                   [n=1,897]           [n=684]   [n=550]    [n=325]             [n=3,456]    37.1% 
 
HMO,  not  offered  choice   $1,349   $1,820   $2,861   $1,860   $1,812 
     $1,788   $1,839   $1,910   $1,826   $1,831 
          [n=493]           [n=1,223]   [n=183]    [n=543]           [n=2,442]    25.2% 
 
Non-HMO,  offered  choice   $1,715   $2,057   $2,040   $1,511   $1,897 
     $1,829   $1,830   $1,888   $1,811   $1,861 
          [n=293]    [n=188]             [n=1,546]           [n=513]            [n=2,540]    24.9% 
 
HMO,  offered  choice    $1,677   $1,619   $2,121   $2,009   $1,948 
     $1,879   $1,894   $1,848   $1,880   $1,877 
     [n=178]   [n=481]   [n=426]            [n=2,149]            [n=3,234]    16.5% 
 
 Total     $1,758   $1,722   $2,024   $1,915   $1,859 
     $1,873   $1,839   $1,862   $1,861   $1,859 
                  [n=2,861]           [n=2,576]           [n=2,705]           [n=3,530]          [n=11,672] 
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Table 3: Risk Selection Based on Medical Care Use in Round 1 
 
         S t d .      S t d .      S t d .  
    Variable   Coefficient      Error   Coefficient Error   Coefficient Error 
       
Non-HMO in round 1 
- non-HMO in round 2    1530**   466    1992**   495      943    695 
- HMO in round 2       1320**   482    1803**   503      860    691 
 
HMO in round 1 
- HMO in round 2      1587**   472    2058**   508       961   702 
- non-HMO in round 2     1957**   489    2435**   525   1249   724 
 
Female                   632**   110   593**   104 
Age: (56-65 is omitted group) 
-  under  2  years  of  age        3934**   700   4912**   811 
- between 2 and 17                        -1445**   264     -557    486 
-  between  18  and  40          -766**   274     -190   298 
   - between 40 and 55               -865**   270     -556**   281 
 
Other  potentially  observable      NO       NO     YES   
   characteristics included? 
   
Number  of  observations     6,235     6,235     6,235 
 
Notes: dependent variable is medical care use in round 1, measured in dollars.  ** = significantly different from zero at the five-percent level; * = 
significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.  Bold coefficients indicate that the expenditure difference in round 1 between the people 
switching plan types and those remaining in a particular plan type is significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.  All specifications 
include indicator variables for the site of the survey (usually a metropolitan statistical area).  Additional potentially observable enrollee and 
employer characteristics include: self-reported health, marital status, children, race, education, household income, type of employer (i.e., private or 
government), and number of employees at the person’s firm.  The constant is omitted.  Sample includes people who had a choice between an 
HMO and a non-HMO plan in round 2. 
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Table 4: Risk Selection Based on Medical Care Use in Round 1 for Enrollees With and Without a Choice of Plan Types in Round 1 
 
         S t d .      S t d .      S t d .  
    Variable   Coefficient      Error   Coefficient Error   Coefficient Error 
       
Non-HMO, no choice in round 1 
- non-HMO in round 2    1241**   488    1793**   252      764    710 
-  HMO  in  round  2       1658**   551   2084**   342   1072   713 
Non-HMO, with choice in round 1 
- non-HMO in round 2    1647**   468    2064**   251       982   696 
- HMO in round 2       1121**   478    1626**   239       695   702 
HMO, no choice in round 1 
- HMO in round 2      1475**   503    1977**   284       806   724 
- non-HMO in round 2     2475**   598    2898**   429    1691**   798 
HMO, choice in round 1 
-  HMO  in  round  2    1628**   474   2078**   215       976   702 
- non-HMO in round 2     1752**   501    2239**   314    1037    727 
 
Female                   633**   110   594**   105 
Age: (56-65 is omitted group) 
-  under  2  years  of  age        3899**   694   4904**   808 
- between 2 and 17                        -1428**   265     -515    487 
-  between  18  and  40          -756**   274     -185   298 
   - between 40 and 55               -852**   271     -547*    282 
 
Other  potentially  observable      NO       NO     YES   
   characteristics included? 
   
Number  of  observations     6,235     6,235     6,235 
 
Notes: dependent variable is medical care use in round 1, measured in dollars.  ** = significantly different from zero at the five-percent level; * = 
significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.  Bold coefficients indicate that the expenditure difference in round 1 between the people 
switching plan types and those remaining in a particular plan type is significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.  All specifications 
include indicator variables for the site of the survey (usually a metropolitan statistical area).  Additional potentially observable enrollee and 
employer characteristics include: self-reported health, marital status, children, race, education, household income, type of employer (i.e., private or 
government), and number of employees at the person’s firm.  The constant is omitted.  Sample includes people who had a choice between an 
HMO and a non-HMO plan in round 2. 
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Table 5: Coefficient Estimates on the Determinants of Medical Care Use in Round 2 of CTSHS Survey 
 
         S t d .      S t d .      S t d .  
    Variable   Coefficient      Error   Coefficient Error   Coefficient Error 
       
Enrolled in non-HMO in round 2 
- non-HMO in round 1    1302**   240    1749**   323      795    549 
- HMO in round 1 (switcher)     1421**   281    1917**   405      851    616 
 
Enrolled in HMO in round 2 
- HMO in round 1      1258**   232    1751**   318       722   577 
- non-HMO in round 1 (switcher)     936**   252    1431**   332       515   572 
 
Female                   552**   103   532**   102 
Age: (56-65 is omitted group) 
-  under  2  years  of  age          -228   653       506   790 
- between 2 and 17                        -1201**   264     -523    510 
-  between  18  and  40          -832**   274     -318   303 
   - between 40 and 55               -715**   265     -412    269 
 
Other  potentially  observable      NO       NO     YES   
   characteristics included? 
   
Number  of  observations     6,235     6,235     6,235 
 
Notes: dependent variable is medical care use in round 2, measured in dollars.  ** = significantly different from zero at the five-percent level; * = 
significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.  Bold coefficients indicate that the expenditure difference in round 2 between the people 
switching plan types and those remaining in a particular plan type is significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. All specifications 
include indicator variables for the site of the survey (usually a metropolitan statistical area).  Additional potentially observable enrollee 
characteristics include: self-reported health, marital status, children, race, education, and household income.  The constant is omitted.  Sample 
includes people who had a choice between an HMO and a non-HMO plan in round 2. 
 26   27
Table 6 
 
Probability of Switching Plan Types By Type of Plan and Medical Expenditures in Round 1 
 
Enrolled in a non-HMO plan in Round 1 (n=2,934) 
       Medical  Expenditures  in  Round  1 
 
      Z e r o   t o   2 5






th Above  90
th 
    
              Zero  percentile  percentile   percentile   percentile   percentile  Total 
 
Mean round 1 expenditures           $0       $203       $486      $1,029      $2,327      $11,679  $1,868 
 
Proportion enrolled in an      0.290      0.289      0.299        0.282        0.295         0.234    0.286 
   HMO plan in round 2 
 
 
Enrolled in an HMO plan in Round 1 (n=3,301) 
       Medical  Expenditures  in  Round  1 
 
      Z e r o   t o   2 5






th Above  90
th 
    
              Zero  percentile  percentile   percentile   percentile   percentile   Total 
 
Mean round 1 expenditures           $0       $201       $488      $1,070      $2,579      $12,548  $2,046 
 
Proportion enrolled in a       0.226      0.180      0.175        0.163        0.190         0.210    0.184 




Notes:  The sample is restricted to people with a choice of both an HMO and a non-HMO plan in round 2. 
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Table 7: Probit Coefficient Estimates: Likelihood of Switching Plan Types 
               
       Variable          Enrolled in a Non-HMO in Round 1    Enrolled in an HMO in Round 1 
 
No  medical  use  in  Round  1   -0.169    -0.0066      0.217**     0.205** 
     (0.0732)  (0.0745)  (0.0772)  (0.0784) 
 
Round  1  medical  expenditures   -0.0191    -0.0196      0.025**     0.026** 
      ($000)    (0.0120)  (0.0123)  (0.010)    (0.011) 
 
Round 1 expenditures squared     3.7 X 10
-7     4.0 X 10
-7    -4.0 X 10
-7    -4.3 X 10
-7 
     ( 3 . 4   X   1 0
-7)    (3.5 X 10
-7)    (2.6 X 10
-7)    (2.7 X 10
-7) 
 
F e m a l e            0 . 0 3 3 3        - 0 . 0 2 5 2  
        ( 0 . 0 5 0 2 )      ( 0 . 0 5 1 9 )  
Age: (56-65 is omitted group) 
-  under  2  years  of  age         0.463**      -0.136 
         (0.231)       (0.222) 
-  between  2  and  17         0.375**      -0.0615 
         (0.096)       (0.112) 
-  between  18  and  40         0.469**        0.0190 
         (0.089)       (0.104) 
      -  between  40  and  55         0.152*         0.0100 
        (0.087)       (0.104) 
 
Constant     -0.537**   -0.834**   -0.968**   -0.952** 
     (0.0324)  (0.085)    (0.0332)  (0.101) 
 
Pseudo R
2         0.001        0.01      0.004      0.004 
 
Number  of  observations        2,934      2,934      3,301      3,301 
 
Notes: dependent variable is one if respondent was enrolled in a non-HMO plan in round 1 and an HMO in round 2, or was enrolled in an HMO 
plan in round 1 and a non-HMO plan in round 2 of the survey.  Sample is restricted to people with a choice of both an HMO and a non-HMO plan 
in round 2.  ** = significantly different from zero at the five-percent level; * = significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level.   
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Appendix 
 
Analysis of Response Bias for Round 2 of the Community Tracking Study Household Survey 
 
Dependent variable is one if the person was re-interviewed in round 2, and zero otherwise 
 
  Coefficient       Standard Error  
 
Enrolled in an HMO      -0.153**    0.034           
Offered HMO and non-HMO    -0.027        0.035     
HMO * offered both plan types     0.079*    0.047  
Age indicator: 18-39      -0.691**    0.040    
Age indicator: 40-55      -0.159**    0.039     
Female          0.062**    0.024      
Marital status: 
   - single, with children     -0.405**               0.046     
   - single, no children      -0.446**    0.036    
   - married, no children                -0.193**       0.033     
African American      -0.369**    0.044            
Asian           -0.416**    0.066     
Hispanic        -0.408 **    0.049     
High school graduate       0.530**    0.046     
College graduate       0.476**    0.045     
Masters degree         0.403**    0.054      
Self-reported health: 
   - very good          0.133**    0.028    
   - good         0.096**    0.034      
   - fair           0.028     0.055      
   - poor          0.096     0.112      
Household income: 
   - below $10,000       -0.248**    0.056     
   - $10,000 - $49,999       -0.252**    0.043     
   - $50,000 - $99,999        0.006       0.040      
Employer: 
   - government        0.051      0.033      
   -  fewer than 10 employees       -0.088**       0.041     
   - 10-1000 employees     -0.036     0.029     
Medical resource use in   -1.6 X 10
-5**      3.22 X 10
-06      
   round 1      
Constant         -0.362**       0.053     
 
n                34,029 
Pseudo R
2                0.03 
 
Notes:  ** = significantly different from zero at the five-percent level; * = significantly different from 
zero at the 10-percent level.   
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